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UNSOLVED PROBEMS OF THE LAW, AS EMBRACED
IN MENTAL ALIENATION.
All science has its unsolved problems. They originate in the
remote fields of human research and investigation, near the
boundary-line which affixes the limit to all human knowledge.
They occur where new or hitherto unknown series of phenomena
present themselves of so refractory a character as to refuse
submission to the most comprehensive laws or sweeping general-
izations which the human mind in its present stage of progress can
by any possibility deduce or originate. They stand as ever-faithful
sentinels on the outposts of human knowledge, defining the limits
between the known and the unknown; witnesses to the mind's
limited capacity; and admonishing that, until their solution is
rendered possible, all beyond should be consigned to doubt and
uncertainty, if not entirely handed over to marvel and mystery.
One beautiful provision here, however, we cannot fail to notice, and
that is, that the unsolved problems of one age are not those of
another; that the laws and generalizations of each successive
generation and century, becoming more comprehensive and sweep-
ing, reach and successively solve those problems by reducing to
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submission their refractory phenomena, thus moving on clearing
up doubt and uncertainty, and banishing marvel and mystery, until
another barrier is reached, and other unsolved problems telegraph
back, that laws and generalizations still more comprehensive and
sweeping, are required for their solution. Thus, in successive
oscillations between the two, swings the mighty pendulum that
marks the mind's progress on the dial plate of centuries.
What are the unsolved problems of the law? We propose only
to discuss some that are involved in MENTAL ALIENATION-A
Medico-Legal topic second to few others in general importance.
As every thing included under this term consists of phenomena,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain a definition sufficiently
comprehensive to include them all, and yet so distinctive as to
create the proper limitation. That, which is perhaps the most
unexceptionable, although not quite sufficiently distinctive, is the
following, viz.: that it is "an aberration of the manifestations of
the mind from their ordinary, normal, healthy state." This, as
well as most other definitions that have been proposed, regards
the disease as psychological or mental, rather than as physiological
or organic. The first problem that meets the medical profession,
and demands of it a solution, regards the nature or seat of the
difficulty. Is it a mental or moral disease, having its seat in the
mind or soul; or is it a bodily disease to be referred to a suffering
organ, the brain ? Or is there some middle ground upon which
the two can be united ? Each one of these has its advocates, and
the correct solution of it is of considerable importance to the
medical profession, but not so much so to the legal. We shall not,
therefore, enter into its discussion.
Mental Alienation, where it is shown to exist, is a disqualifying
disease, and the next point of inquiry relates to the grounds upon
which legal exemption proceeds, and the divisions in the disease
which correspond to those grounds. The law being a rule of civil
action, having its appropriate sanctions, requires two conditions to
give it any moral efficacy in its applications. The one of these
consists in the ability or mental capacity of those subject to it,
requiring sufficient to comprehend the rule and the consequencei
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of its violation. The other renders it necessary, that those so
subject, should be free moral agents, masters of their own actions,
and capable of acting upon motives common to the race to which
they belong. The absence of either one of these would necessarily
free from all responsibility.
The two great divisions of mental alienation correspond pre-
cisely to these grounds of exemption. It is resolved primarily
into two forms or classes; the first includes all those who are
mentally alienated from defective development, or diminished
power and activity of the faculties, while the second includes all
those who are deranged from excessive action or undue excitement
of the faculties. The first include all cases of idiocy, imbecility,
and dementia; the second all the more active forms of mania or
insanity. What we propose at present briefly to discuss relates to
the means of identifying these different forms, and the application
of legal principles to them-First, in relation to civil; second, as to
criminal responsibility.
Of the three kinds embraced in the first class, or those whose
aberration arises from defective development, that of idiocy is
easily identified. It is not only congenital, but it deviates from
the healthy condition in bodily structure and organs, while at the
same time there is a marked deficiency in mental manifestation, all
of which serve to divest the case of doubt and difficulty. Imbecility
occurs subsequent to birth, and is of more difficult detection. It is
of various grades or degrees, ranging from an intelligence little
short of that which is normal and found in sound minds, down to
the imbecile, who cut off the head of a man he found sleeping
under a hedge, and then hid himself behind it, in order to witness
the surprise of the body on its waking.
A German writer, Hoffbauer, has distinguished two forms of
this, which he names silliness and stupidity; the first arising from
defect of reflective power, the second from that of perceptive. He
also assigns to each, different gradations or degrees. It is difficult
to establish any certain test by which imbecility is to be recog-
nised: those accustomed to witnessing it will generally be able to
detect it. So the utter inability to display the ordinary amount
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of mental power will reveal to all close observers, the existence of
imbecility.
-Dementia is characterized by a preternatural enfeeblement of
the moral or intellectual power, or of both. It supervenes in a
mind fully developed, is sometimes consequent on mania, mental
shocks, or injuries of the brain, and sometimes first appears in old
age. This is marked by a new feature, which has. not hitherto
appeared, viz., incoherence. Persons, places, times, and circum-
stances, are jumbled together. They occur disjointedly, succeed-
ing each other without any regular order. Dissimilar objects are
mistaken for each other. This, together with the evidences of
general enfeeblement, and the marked change that has taken place
in the individual, will render very little doubtful, any case that
may present itself. When the dementia arises from a sudden
mental shock, the disease frequently takes its hue from that which
caused it; as in the case of the Norwegian fisherman, '&ho being
about meeting his bride in a boat, a sudden squall upset that
containing her and her friends, who were all drowned. From that
moment he became insane, and from morning till night, during the
rest of his life, he was accustomed to sit upon a small stool, which
he fancied a boat, with his arms and body constantly in the
attitude of rowing, and admonishing every visitor to beware how
he approached as the water was very deep.
The condition involved in idiocy, imbecility, and dementia, arises
quite frequently for discussion and settlement in courts of law and
equity. The first thing necessary is to establish the fact that such
a condition exists. In Jackson vs. King, 4 Cowen, 207, and Odell
vs. Buck, 21 Wend. 142, it is held, that where that condition
alone is interposed as a defence, it must be clearly made out;
that mere weakness of understanding is' not, of itself, any objection
in law to the validity of a contract; that the law draws no dis-
criminating line by which to determine how great must be the
imbecility of mind to render a contract void, or how much intellect
must remain to uphold it; that if a man be legally compos mentis,
he is the disposer of his own property, ard his will stands for a
reason for his actions. The condition must, therefore, be shown
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to be abnormal, the defect preternatural, before it can be recog-
nised by the courts.
But where there is an allegation of fraud, the parties may stop
short of proving this condition or defect: 1 Story's Equity Juris-
prudence, § 227. Thus, in Blackford vs. Christian, I Knapp's
Rep. 73, Lord Wynford, after remarking that to impeach a
conveyance on the ground of imbecility, required as strong a case
to be made out as in a proceeding under a commission of lunacy
to justify the placing of property and person under the protec-
tion of the Chancellor, proceeds to say-"but a degree of weak-
ness of intellect far below that which would justify such a proceed-
ing, coupled with other circumstances to show that the weakness,
such as it was, had been taken advantage of, will be sufficient to
set aside any important deed." And among other evidence, the
nature of the act or deed itself is entitled to full consideration :
1 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, § 238. Thus the acts and con-
tracts of persons of weak understandings, and who are thereby
liable to imposition, will be held void in courts of equity, if the
nature of the act or contract, together with its attendant circum-
stances, justify the conclusion, that the party has not exercised a
deliberate judgment, but that he has been imposed upon, circum-
vented, or overcome by cunning, artifice, or undue influence:
1 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, § 250; Gartside vs. Isherwood,
1 Brown's Chancery Rep. 560-61.
Questions are frequently arising in the courts involving the tes-
tamentary capacity where this condition is alleged to exist. These
are sometimes presented as purely questions of mental alienation,
preternatural defect, or of weakness of mind upon which fraud and
imposition have been practised. In reference to the former, various
tests have been laid down. Thus, in 8 Mass. Rep. 372, the test
proposed in the instruction to the jury, was the possessing of suffi-
cient discretion for that purpose, and the ability at the time to
recollect the particulars the testator had dictated. In 'Fan Alst
vs. Hunter, 5 Johns. Chan. Rep. 148, the Chancellor says: "c The
law looks only to the competency of the understanding. The
failure of the memory is not sufficient to create the incapacity,
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unless it be quite total, or extend to his immediate family and pro-
perty." In Clarke vs. Fisher, 1 Paige, 171, Chancellor Walworth
lays down the test, that the testator must be of sound disposing
mind and memory, so as to be capable of making a testamentary
disposition of his property with sense and judgment, in reference
to the situation and amount of such property, and to the relative
claims qf the different persons who are, or might be, the objects
of his bounty. The law seems inclined to admit that the testa-
mentary capacity exists where there is a degree of mental imbe-
cility that incapacitates for ordinary business. Thus, in 8 Wash.
0. 0. Rep. 587, Judge Washington says " - The capacity may be
perfect to dispose of property by will,.yet very inadequate for the
managenient of other business, as to make contracts for the pur-
chase and sale of property." He lays down the test to be, 9if
the testator has such a mind and memory as enable him to under-
stand the elements of which a will is composed, the dispiosition of
his property in its simplest form." The case which carries the
testamentary capacity the furthest, is that of Stewart's -Executor
vs. Lispenard, 26 Wend. 255, in which the majority of the court
say, that in passing upon the validity of a will, courts do not
measure the extent of the understanding of the testator, and that
if he be not totally deprived of reason, whether he be wise or un-
wise, he is the lawful disposer of his property, and his will stands
as a reason for his actions.
The second class or division of the mentally alienated, includes
all those whose derangement arises from excessive action, or undue
excitement of the faculties. This embraces the more active forms
of MANIA. "Here we have," says Dr. Guy, "a series of delu-
sions, the offspring of some one excited passion or emotion, or one
single delusion, the work of fancy, the interpretation of every
sensation, the source of every thought, the mainspring of every
action, holding every faculty in stern subjection, making the senses
its dupes, the reason its advocate, the fancy its sport, and the will
its slave; now whispering in the ear things unspoken, now paint-
ing on the eye things unseen; changing human beings at will into
fiends or angels; converting every sensation into a vision; every
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sound into articulate speech; the unreal world within in constant
conflict with the real world without; understood of no one, yet
believing himself to be comprehended by all; punished for the
very actions which he supposes his tyrants to have commanded;
controlled in everything which he thinks it his duty to perform.
There is no wish, however presumptuous; no fancy, however mon-
strous; no action, however absurd; no crime, however heinous,
that his delusion cannot create, prompt, and justify." Guy's
Principles of Forensic Medicine, 328.
Without pausing here to distinguish between general and partial
intellectual mania, I may say that the great distinguishing feature
of both consists in the surrender of the mind to hallucination or
delusion. The first inquiry here is, what is a hallucindtion or de-
lusion which is sufficient to create insanity ? Sir John Nicholl has
defined it to be c a belief of facts which no rational person would
have believed." This has been objected to by Lord Brougham,
as giving a consequence for a definition. His Lordship offers as
a substitute, "A belief of things as realities which exist only in,
the imagination of the patient." This is still more objectionable.
It covers the hallucinations of the sane as well as those of the
insane. Socrates had his demon, Luther had visits from the prince
of darkness, and old Ben Jonson saw legions of devils dancing
around his great toe. But neither of these were insane. They,
and many others of the same character, were conscious that what
appeared to them as hallucinations were really such, and not the
realities to which their minds were bound to render allegiance.
To make an insane hallucination it must not only be a reality
existing only in the imagination of the patient, but it must also be
a belief which to him is ordinary and normal, and to which he sur-
renders the homage of his actions.
These hallucinations are very diversified. The late Rev. Simon
Brown for many years before his death, entertained the belief that
he had lost his rational soul; that it had gradually perished, leaving
only the animal life remaining. The late R1ev. Daniel Haskell,
for many years President of the University of Vermont, enter-
tained the hallucination that he was dead, since some definite
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epoch gone by; that it was in some other world, not this, he for-
merly lived; that he was there a rebel, and that 'hence God had
removed him into another state, where he was then remaining,
although it was a wonder and a mystery. See 15 American
Journal of Insanity, 137. A lunatic at Wartsburgh supposed
there was a person concealed within his belly, with whom he held
frequent communications. Many have supposed themselves some
distinguished person, as Mahomet, Louis XIV., Jesus Christ.
The important legal problem here is, where a single hallucina-
tion, rendering the case one of partial, not of general insanity,
exists, what effect is it to have upon contracts or wills, made and
executed during its continuance ? Is it to invalidate all contracts
or wills so made, or only those which are brought within the sphere
of its influence? The latter was once clearly settled in English juris-
prudence: -Dew vs. Clark, 3 Addams Rep. 79, in which the question
is very elaborately considered by Sir John Nicholl. But in a late
case occurring in 1848, that of Waring vs. Waring, 6 Moore P.
C. Cases, 849, Lord Brougham, before the Privy Council, delivered
an opinion without dissent, as the judgment of himself, Lord
Langdale, Dr. Lushington and Mr. T. Pemberton Leigh, inaugu-
rating a totally different doctrine. See case referred to in Whai-
ton and Stilld's Medical Jurisprudence, § and p. 17, and 6 American
Journal of Insanity, 808. Lord Brougham says: "We are wrong
in speaking of partial unsoundness; we are less incorrect in speak-
ing of occasional unsoundness: we should say that the unsound-
ness always exists, but it requires a reference to the peculiar topic,
else it lurks and appears not. But the malady is there, and as the
mind is one and the same, it is really diseased while apparently
sound; and really its acts, whatever appearance they may put on,
are only the acts of a morbid or unsound mind." Thus the dogma
of the mind's being a single general power, equally capable of act-
ing in every direction, lies at the foundation, and has probably pro-
duced, as its fruits, the principle asserted in this case. The effect of
it is to annihilate partial insanity; or rather to transfer partial into
general. Thus all who may chance to be laboring under an hallu-
cination or delusion in reference to a particular subject,- although
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perfectly sane on all others, is, in virtue of the establishment of
this principle, to be deemed legally incompetent to act at all.
This seems at present to be settled law in England, but the doc-
trine of "insane on one point, insane on all," must certainly dis-
franchise multitudes who are now considered competent to dis-
charge all the business relations of life.
No court in this country has adopted that principle. With us
the establishment of a particular hallucination destroys the legal'
capacity of acting as to all those matters to which the hallucination
relates; leaving still the capacity to act as to all such matters as
are unaffected by it. Whenever, therefore, an act, as a will or a
contract, is sought to be avoided on the ground of partial insanity,
the first thing to be done is to establish the hallucination, which
must be entertained as true, and must be false in fact. The next
is to trace the act in question directly to the hallucination, either
as being' actually produced by it, or so intimately connected with
it, as to lead to the presumption that it never would have occurred
had not the hallucination existed: Dean's Medical Jurisprudence,
571.
An illustration of this is found in the case of Johnson vs. Moore's
Heirs, 1 Littell's Rep. 371. There one George Moore, in the
delirium of a fever, was led to entertain the delusive idea that his
brothers were seeking to destroy him. The idea was without the
shadow of a foundation. He recovered from the disease but the
hallucination still remained, and under its influence he made his
will, giving all his property to others. The court set aside the
will.
Another point of considerable difficulty that often presents
itself is the establishment of a LuCID INTERVAL. This question
can never arise except in those cases where the fact of mania has
been once established. The continuance of it is then to be pre-
sumed until proof of a state of sanity is offered. The medical
profession are not entirely agreed as to alternations of insanity
and reason. The possibility of their occurrence, however, cannot
well be doubted, and the main question is what amount of proof
shall be required to establish the fact of a Lucid Interval such as
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the law requires to restore legal competency. The Chancellor
D'Aguesseau in the case of the Abbe d'Orleans (see Evans' Pothier.
on Obligations, Appendix, 579), after considerable discussion, says:
"it must be, not a mere diminution, a remission of the complaint,
but a kind of temporary cure, an intermission so clearly marked,
as in every respect to resemble the restoration of health."
The English Court of Chancery have substantially adopted the
same views. In the Attorney- General vs. Parnthier, 3 Brown's
Chan. Rep. 234, Lord Thurlow says: "By a perfect interval, I
do not mean a ctoler moment, an abatement of pain or violence,
or of a higher state of 'torture-a mind relieved from excessive
pressure; but an interval in which the mind, having thrown off the
disease, had recovered its general habit." He insists that the
evidence in support of a lucid interval should be as strong and
demonstrative of such fact as where the object of the proof is to
establish derangement. That such evidence should go to the state
and habit of the person, and not to what might be disclosed in an
accidental interview, or to the circumstances attending a particular
act. See also White vs. Driver, 1 Phil. 84, and Groom vs. Thomas,
2 Hagg's Eccl. Rep. 433, in the latter of which the doctrine laid
down was that where there is not actual recovery, and a return to
the management of himself and his concerns, by the unfortunate
individual, the proof of a lucid interval is extremely difficult.
There are other legal investigations as to the mental condition
besides those relating to the legality of a particular act. Both in
England, and in most of the United States, a commission' in the
nature of a writ de lunatico inquirendo can at any time issue Qut
of a court having competent jurisdiction, the object of which is to
ascertain -hether the individual mentioned in it is, or is noti
capable of the management of his estate. The alleged cause of
incapacity may arise either from mental unsoundness, or from
habitual drunkenness. It is a proceeding instituted on the part
of the friends of the alleged lunatic, and if successful, results in
the appointment of a committee of the person and estate, who is,
or are, legally authorized to act for him in all matters relating to
his estate. The writ issues to certain named commissioners, who
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are directed by means of a jury to inquire into and find the fact
as to capacity, and to return their inquisition to the court out of
which it issued.
A point of much importance has arisen here as to whether the
finding must be limited to the fact of lunacy, and the incapacity
consequent thereupon, or whether it may relate to incapacity
generally, such, for instance, as may arise from old age and mere
mental weakness. In -Ex parte Barnsley, 3 Atk. "168, a commis-
sion issued to inquire whether Barnsley was a lunatic, and the
inquisition found that from weakness of mind he was incapable of
governing himself and his estate. Lord Hardwicke held that the
inquisition must be quashed for insufficiency, in that it had not
found the fact of lunacy. The same doctrine was- subsequently
declared in Lord D)onegal's Case, 2 Vesey 407. A deviation from
this strict rule is made by Lord Eldon in 6 Vesey 273, in which
he says it is sufficient that the party is incapable of managing his
own affairs. The subject also underwent further investigation in
Bidgeway vs. Darwin, 8 Vesey 65, and in .Ez parte &ranmer, 12
Vesey 445. Lord Erskine held that the jurisdiction of the Chan-
cellor embraced cases of imbecility resulting from old age, sickness,
or other causes. The question he said was whether the party had
become mentally incapable of managing his affairs.
In the courts of New York the point has several times been
presented, as In the matter of Barker, 2 Johns. Chan. Rep. 232,
In the matter of Wendell, 1 Johns. Chan. Rep. 600, and In the
matter of Mason, 1 Barbour's Supreme Court Rep. 436, in which
is very fully sustained the sufficiency of an inquisition finding the
person of unsound mind and mentally incapable of managing his
affairs.
Under these rulings of the Courts it is obvious that every species
of mental alienation, with the exception perhaps of the moral or
impulsive kind, may come up for consideration in these proceed-
ings. In cases of preternatural defect in the power of mental
manifestation, it may in most cases be easy to determine. The
difficult cases are those of hallucination or delusion, where it is of
